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THE COSTS OF MULTICULTURALISM
Bemdt Ostendorf (Amerika Institut, L~, München)
"Can we live together?"
Rodney King
The Debate.
"Once America was a microcosm of European nationalities, " says Molefi Asante, chair-
man of the African-American studies department at Temple University and proponent of
an Afrocentric curriculum for blacks, "today America is a microcosm of the world."l Da-
es the new global quality of theethnic diversity in the D.S. make it expedient to supplant
the notion of a "failed" melting pot with that of a "newand improved" multicultural socie-
ty?
Multiculturalism is a relatively vague concept with a set of contradictory hidden agendas;
these contradictions multiply when multiculturalism is translated from a theory of peda-
gogy or of representation into political practice. If a new politics of multiculturalism
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would ensure the ereation of a more tolerant and demoeratie world most people would
aeeept it readily. Yet, the historieal reeord of multieultural soeieties has not been promi-
sing, even less that of multiracial soeieties.2 The eollapse of the "Vielvölkerstaat" Austria-
Hungary ushered in aseries of wars over nationalist agendas whieh have eontinued into
the present. The most ethnieally diverse eontemporary power, the former Soviet Union, is
beset by ethnie eonflicts as are the new national subunits that are forming after its desin-
tegration. The history of Lebanon, formerly known as the "Switzerland of the Near East,"
does not augur weIl for what used to be praised as a model of ethnie eoexistenee: eon-
soeiationalism, or, in the euerent terminology, eorporate multieulturalism.~And the eur-
rent strife in Yugoslavia should be a lesson that strong ethnie bonding whieh is all the
rage the world over makes for bad practieal politics, particularly when it comes to solving
interethnie eonflicts. Yet, writes Time magazine in April 1990 in a self-eongratulatory
.mood, Ameriea is different; for in the U.S. multieulturalism was ereated by a (largely)
voluntary immigration, a proeess whieh has been a souree of the eountry's great strength.
That may weIl be, if we follow Time for a moment in its blatant disregard for the very
groups that keep the multieultural agendas in the V.S. alive, Afriean Amerieans, Hispa-
nies and Native Amerieans. It is beeoming increasingly obvious that the breakup of the
American political will into competing ethnie lobbies across the racial fault line - one re-
sult of the "ethnifieation" of America sinee 1965 - creates a number of new problems,
many of them unintended or unexpeeted. For one thing the empowerment of diserete
ethnie groups has not redueed confliet between them. Interethnie and partieularly inter-
racial frietion between Afriean Americans, Hispanies, Koreans, Jews and Italians actually
seems to be on the rise as the ugly incidents in Washington D.C., in Miami, in New York
Citys Central Park, in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn, Los Angeles, Houston and Seattle attest.
And .divisions on Ameriean campuses along raeial and ethnie lines have hardened, per-
haps not to the degree that the media would make us believe, but the elimate is bad
enough to· warrant attention. (The media are not exactly innoeent bystanders in the erea-
tion of a new acrimonious mood.) The euerent dispute over the eontent of edueation,
whether it should pay more attention to an allegedly universal (but primarily Euro-Ame-
riean) eore or to the demands of multi-ethnie Amerieans for instruction in their respeetive
eultures, is for one of the critics of multieulturalism, Diane Ravitch, a symptom that the
old motto "E pluribus unum" in danger of beeoming "E pluribus plures." Arthur Sehle-
singer Jr., in a similarly jeremiadie mood, diagnoses in the new multicultural orthodoxy a
ttdisuniting of Ameriea,tt and Robert Hughes suggests that the euerent "fraying of Ameri-
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ca" will create the sort of factions that, in George Washington's words, were the biggest
threat to the young republic.4
In his book One Nation Divisible Richard Polenberg points to a radical change in the
nation's structure of feeling: in the thirties America was characterized by sharp regional
contrasts in language, cuisine and lifestyles, yet its population stood unified behind the
universalism of the American creed, which found a popular expression in lohn Steinb-
eck's novels and Frank Capra's films. By the nineties American everyday culture and
landscape with its TV-networked motels, fast food chains and identical suburban
shopping malls had become thoroughly homogenized, yet the population was more frag-
mented than ever along ethnic and ideologica1lines. In contradiction to the theories of
modernization so dear to the fifties and sixties fragmentation along nationalist and ethnic
lines has increased as everyday culture became ever more unified. Behind tbis change lie
ideological, economic and demographic shifts, and consequently a realignment of the
classic American compromise between the individual, the group, and the polity, a real-
ignment based on a new appreciation of cultural difference.
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN HISTORYS
Let us pause for a moment and ask, what were the historical choices for inclusion or ex-
clusion of ethnic groups in the American polity? What choices were made in treating mi-
nority groups or nations within the state? It will be seen that all variants of exclusion and
inclusion are still alive, either as historical memory or as political agendas. For practical
purposes the following ideal-type-taxonomy will draw most examples from the historical
experience of African Americans, of native Americans and of Hispanics in the U.S.A..6
EXCLUSION
In American history the dominant group of white, Anglosaxon Protestant men has used
all sorts of differential variants to ensure the exclusion of blacks, Hispani"cs, Native Ameri-
cans and women from power. America began with the massive exclusion of the original
population. By settling and taking the land in America white European settIers literally
"displaced" the native Americans which in history led to large scale disruption.7 Many
native American groups became alienated both from their own native culture and were
kept separate from the dominant cultures, usually by forcible exclusion. In the wake of






































drawal, and deculturative stress. A current example of such disruption are the socalIed
triracial isolates who are of mixed African American, Native American and white blood,
but who have lost cultural continuity with any one of these groups. Their fate may be
called a form of ethnocide, the destruction not of a group, but of most cultural bearings.8
(Many of these groups are now trying to be recognized as Native Americans and are
reconstructing a "heritage" either from scratch or from anthropology books.) The more
radical step would lead to genocide: This implied the active destruction of certain groups
by straight-forward physical extermination as in the case of some Native American
groups, by excessive labor as in South American slavery, by benign neglect as in the case
of Native Americans in the 18th and 19th centuries or by a combination of these. That
both the fear and the rhetoric of genocide are alive is documented by the leader of.the
Black Muslims, Louis Farrakhan, whoclaims that "white" America is using the aids virus
for genocidal purposes, a claim believed by a large group of African-Americar:'s.
North-American slavery entailed the enforced spatial, social, and political separation of
the cultural groups and their spheres along racial lines on the grounds that enlightenment
universalism (CiviI Rights) did not apply to inferior races. This legitimation of hegemony
was accompanied by a strong belief in cultural or racial hierarchy and evolution. We find
this belief persisting after the Civil War, in the creationof the Black Codes, in direct seg-
regation in the South articulated in a system of sharecropping (Le. economic marginaliza-
tion), but also in the structural segregation through real-estate-induced ghettoization in
the North. The National Association for the Advancement of White People led by David
Duke still pursues a politics of racial separation along the lines of white supremacy.
But separation mayaIso be a form of making the best of a bad deal, Le. as a withdrawal
and defensive separatism on the part of the group which is the object of discrimination.9
Native Americans withdrew to "reservations", a term that expresses both the white and
Native American desire for separate spheres though for entirely different reasons. Many
blacks had become sceptical of the all-American values of integration and of universalism
and of proprietary individualism as distant and unachievable promises. To make up for
their frustration of political or social hopes they invested their energies in separate institu-
tions, in the church, in clubs, leisure activities, and street-life.10 Their cultural tradition is
"overdetermined" as a compensatory mechanism to make up for the lack of social and
political participation. This is the reason why the church has become the political center of
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black life in the South or in some Northern inner eitles. Culture heroes (religion, music,
sports) become more important and have more credibility than political figures who by
virtue of their involvement with the white power structure are considered Uncle Toms or
compromisers. This overdetermination of culture is typical of the black rural population,
of the black church in the South; and of passive sections of the so-called urban under-
class.11 The second, more militant stage of this voluntary withdrawal has been called a
reactive separatism: here we witness active resistance, chiliastic separatism, aggressive
nationalism and race consciousness. Now the will to separate along raciallines is encoura-
ged by both sides, and thel discriminated group reacts with a conscious rejection of We-
stern universalism as colonial hypocrisyand of Western achievement orientation as pa-
thologica1. Such radical boundary maintenance may lead to the demand for aseparate sta-
te/nation/territory and compensation for slavery and slave labour, demands which have
surfaced with some regularity in the political scene until today. Variations of this position
may be found in all Back-To-Africa-Movements; Markus Garvey; radical Black Cultural
Nationalism; the followers of Frantz Fanon and Ron Karenga; the Black Muslims and the
active parts of the urban underclass; and in certain current leadership such as Leonard
Jeffries, Molefi Asante, Louis Farrakhan, Sonny Carson and others. The black movement
has inspired militant Native American movements as weIl. So much for separatist models.
INCLUSION
The integrative variants begin with assimilation which in its most direct form may be
called a form of incorporation: The dominant society simply absorbs and incorporates the
minority without changing its own nature. The political and social identity, Le. Western
universalism and the individualism of the American creed, are accepted by the minority
without reseIVations. Anglo-conformity is the goal in the public sphere where the superio-
rity of Western enlightenment culture is acknowledged. There is also a tacit belief in
cultural hierarchies, but accompanied by a hope both of liberal whites and blacks for "ad-
vancing the race". Biological mergers are accepted. Otherwise ethnic culture, such as there
is, is considered largely a private matter nursed on week-ends in cultural enclaves such as
little Italies, Southsides and Chinatowns. A slightly more radical version of incorporation
has been called the melting pot: the term assumes a willingness on the part of the "other"
to "melt into" the mainstream culturally and socially for the price of full citizenship by
adding a minor ingredient to the common pot which, however, remains Eurocentric. The
dominant political and social system is accepted. There is no attempt to actively maintain
5
separate spheresor identities along raciallines. Intennarriage is accepted. Full citizenship
is more important than culture, hence .issues of class come before race and culture. This
model was embraced by civil rights fighters such as Martin L. King, the NAACPi the
middleclass of the South, the old left, the CPUS.!\. E. Franklin Frazier's Black Bourgeoisie;
Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma; and by many white neoconservatives today.
Some neoconservative blacks such as Thomas Sowell consider the free market to be a sort
of pressure cooker. If the goal of minorities is to reach a certain life style then the shed-
ding of that cultural identity which is incompatible with the achieveI11ent orientation, so
they say, is inevitable. Making it (middle class status) is more irnportant than the warmth
of a subculture. This attitude precludes the total acceptance of the American economic
system as a social leveler. Culture remains relatively meaningless or marginal unless it
can be effectively marketed (as in television). Affirmative action on the basis of "differen-
ce" is rejected as counterproductive or demeaning as is the idea of race as a social or
economic determinant.12 Some new black elites who are products of prep schools and
private universities would hold this view.
A more sophisticated idea of non-hegemonie acculturation is that of creolization: In the
course of American history both an ethnification of Anglo-American culture and an Ame-
ricanization of ethnie cultures may be observed: this dual process of adjustment results in (
something native and new, i.e. creole.13 This process is part of what one might call the
"cultural unconscious" which goes on regardless of what people believe in or think they
see. An example: most of those white Americans who believe in the primacy of Euro-
American culture do not know (or care) that their central traditions of popular music and
dance are black-derived. Indeed, even the white followers of David Duke cannot walk,
talk, sing or dance without tacitly acknowledging the black heritage. If this "unconscious"
process of give and take could be made conscious in a spirit of acceptance, of tolerance
and curiosity and if it were actively encouraged by both groups in a spirit of liberal ex-
pectancy in an open society, America would be a less conflict-ridden place. This notion
rests on the idea of a basic permeability and "instability" of all cultures: hence the cultural
canon should be open to challenges, there shouldbe no particular cultural dominance and
no boundary maintenance up or down, but instead an active and open debate about these
issues. The ideas of cultural hierarchy or of evolution are rejected. The end result is a new
hybrid culture. The problem is that though creolization is a historical fact of non-hegemo-
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nic and often unconscious cultural exchange, it would not work as social policy. Creoliza-
tion, precisely because it represents - in Hegelian terms - the "cunning of culture", cannot
be consciously enforced. The closest approximation to its goals may be found in the idea
of cultural pluralism.
Cultural pluralism, sometimes called "liberal pluralism" or "soft multiculturalism," is in-
spired and motivated by one central ideal: the tolerance of difference. The coexistence of
several cultures is accepted along the lines of racial descent, at same time there is assi-
milation and mixing in the social, economie and political spheres. A fitting metaphor is
that of the salad bowl where different culturalleaves are united by one political dressing
to make one meal. In the language of the Freneh revolution a difference is made between
the ethnie "homme" and the universal "citoyen." Culture is primarily a private matter, but
has relevance as a historical and strategie ar~ment and for eonsciousness raising; it may
also be used to mark areas for the redress of historical discrimination. Ethnic difference is
domesticated within a social and politieal universalism, whieh is aeeepted, albeit in a
spirit of eritieal participation and a eonstant state of alert on the part of the minority.
There is only soft boundary maintenanee beeause ethnie boundaries are ignored as an
signifieant marker in the social or politieal spheres. Bilingualism is aeeepted as a transitio-
nal measure to aehieve full citizenship and partieipation. "Affirmative action" is under-
stood as a temporary and strategie means of aehieving parity, but refused as a permanent
institution. Equality of chances should be guaranteed by a network of social services, but
equality of results is rejected. Cultural Pluralism would acknowledge difference, but in a
basically cooperative, tolerant spirit whieh is guided by a belief in basic civil rights wat-
ehed over by the Supreme Court. Certain members of the liberal blaek and white middle-
class and a great number of "social demoeratie" seholars would embraee this political
utopia. Cultural pluralism represents the American model evoked by many Europeans in-
volved in the debate.14 Unfortunately, this soeial democratic middle ground that Michael
Walzer and Richard Rorty stake out for a pluralist civil society is shrinking. The model is
in danger of losing support among blacks or whites on either extreme of the current con-
troversy.15 Its chances for success have been overtaken by recent events in Los Angeles,
Houston and Seattle.
Much more problematical is the idea of a radieal multiculturalism, sometimes ealled "cor-
porate or strong pluralism" or "eonsociationalism". Unfortunately eorporate multicultural-
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ism is much easier to translate into practice than soft multiculturalism because it enjoys
the support of what Claude Levi-Strauss once called the supreme cultural universal: eth-
nocentrism. It envisages the permanent coexistence of several, separate cultures along
racial and ethnic lines. The consent and voluntarism of a.civil society is rejected for the
determinism of biological, racial, and ethnic difference, and the hard lines of difference
enjoy the protection of law.16 The maintenance of separate cultural identities is a goal of
aseparate but equal educational systems. This brings us back to the apartheid legislation
of Plessy vs. Ferguson in 1896. One demand, advanced by Hispanics, would call for a
maintenance bilingualism, Le. for a permanently bilingual and bicultural society. In terms
of identity there is an extreme boundary maintenance which translates geographically into
separate neighborhoods, separate school districts, and a permanent debate as to who be-
longs to which group; the color, race and ethnic line becomes an important marker for a
proportional distributiot:\ of assets. At colleges and universities groups demand and get
separate programs and housing. Social and political institutions are set up according to
cultural determinants. Political participation proceeds by statistical quotas, economic parti-
cipation by permanent set asides according to groups and cultural aggregates and the end
result is not the equality of chances, but an equality of results on the basis of statistical
parity. Cultural particularism clearly overrides universalism. There is a fierce rejection of
"Euro-American individualism": instead the new bond is ethnic group loyalty.
This sort of consociationalism benefits most of all the ethnic elites, the bureaucrats of
multiculturalism, that are necessary to maintain this proportional division of assets. Once
these are in office they will do everything in their power to stay. There is a tendency of
mutual reinforcement across the racial divide. Leonard Jeffries speaks of the African sun
people as being superior to the European ice people, while David Duke believes in the ra-
cial inferiority of blacks. This type ofradical or corporate multiculturalism which believes
in the political maintenance of "intrinsic" cultural difference is of course much more pro-
blematical. Its end result would be the sort of immobilism without violence that is charac-
teristic of Belgian politics, or with violence of the Lebanon. What are the chances of such
divisive ideologies in the V.S.?
UNIVERSALISM VS PARTICVLARISM
On the most fundamental level we witness an old battle over the meaning of culture. The
tension in the motto on every dollar bill - e pluribus unum - describes the federeal com-
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promise, but it also runs between one universal political culture (protected by the con-
stitution and the amendments) and many different particularistic cultures.17 On the one
hand there is the unifying concept of one culture of "mankind" (the word itself gives rise
to some doubt). It is defined as the glorious project of enlightenment, a liberating project
designed to lead humanity out of fear, darkness and discrimination, to deliver people
from tribalistic, primordial or ancestral bondage and to accept each individual on his/her
own merits. This is the essence of an older liberal humanism which inspires what Gunnar
Myrdal called the American Creed.18 On the other hand we find a differentiating concept
of cultures, of groups and aggregates, that are distinctly separate, but all entitled to mutu-
al recognition and respect.19 This understanding of culture interprets the difference bet-
ween, say, Chicanos and blacks as an entitlement not only to be unique in cultural mat-
ters, but also to differential treatment in politics. And such differential treatment would
not be accorded on the basis of individual merit, but to individuals as members of "racial"
or ethnic groups. The idea of "ethnic difference", which under the univeralist credo was
considered a matter of the private sphere, has since the 1960s become thoroughly politici-
zed, encouraged by the 60s' slogan that the personal is political. The two concepts (one
political culture vs. many ethnic cultures) mark now the two extreme positions in a deep
political conflict.20
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NORM
In the first immigration phase between 1830 and 1920, when ethnic difference was asso-
ciated with cultural inferiority, poverty and bad working conditions, there was a powerful
motive to assimilate to the Anglo-American norm of the good life. Many well-meaning
progressive reformers quite cheerfully took this norm for granted. Even the ethnic groups
themselves contributed to the demise of their own traditions if these stood in the way of
economic betterment. The resulting "melting pot" of former immigrants, however, remai-
ned white, Eurocentric and therefore "encapsulated in white ethnocentrism".21 Under the
protection of the universal norm that aimed for sodal and political assimilation a pragma-
tic cultural pluralism worked moderately weIl, but only for some groups. "The trouble
with American pluralism", Stephen Steinberg writes in The Ethnic Myth. Race, Ethnicity
and Class in America, "derives from the fact that it was built upon systematic inequalities
.... This was the pitfall - the fatal flaw - that robbed ethnic pluralism of its cultural inno-
cence." To which one might add: "inequalities made more systematic by racial divisions."
Whereas the allegedly "color-blind" American Creed swept some white ethnic groups into
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its fold, there remained the problem of racism and its baneful social consequences of open
or tadt discrimination.22 Alexis de Tocqueville·was prophetie when he wrote in the 1840s
that racism when it is removed from the laws withdraws into customs. How does one
overcome institutional structures and racist habits of the heart and how does one compen-
sate for the damages of discrimination1
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE RISE OF ETHNIC CULTURE
It is important to remember that the rise ofethnicity began as a· fight to stop the (racist)
sins against the universalism of the American Creed.23 But it was the Civil Rights Move-
ment of black Americans that also set in motion a rethinking of ethnic difference, thus of
the relationship between (private) culture and (publie) politics. After the Supreme Court
decision Brown vs. Board of Education Topeka, Kansas of 1954 established that separate
facilities for blacks were "inherently unequal", the notion of racial or cultural difference
itself was removed from all legal consideration. To "make a difference" was considered
unconstitutional on the grounds that historical experience showed such difference to lead
to separate and unequal conditions.24 Federal institutions were called upon to undo dif-
ferential treatment and to ensure that blacks were given an "equal opportunity" as mem-
bers of a color-blind political culture. We should not underestimate the impact of the
experience of exclusion on the collective consciousness of· African Americans. Few blacks
could forget that it took America's 18th century political universalism 178 years to recog-
nize them as political equals. By this time the accumulated experience of that exclusion
from mainstream universalism had nurtured a special African American Culture which
was being recognized and appreciated for the first time on a nationallevel.25 Indeed, pat-
terns of cultural nationalism and of a defensive black ethnocentrism were deeply inscribed
in that culture as a consequence of previous exclusion.26
THE VIETNAM TRAUMA
The rise of new ideologies of black cultural nationalism or of white ethnicity at this parti-
cular time has a lot to do with the failure of the American Creed, with the decline of a
broad middle class ideology after the Vietnam War and Watergate and concurrently with
the demise of interethnic "class consciousness" as a factor of social and political orienta-
tion. The decline of the older ideological belief in universalist principles that would make
Americans into one people, indeed that would turn all mankind into the Family of Man
(sic), as a much-visited exhibit of photography was called in the fifties, had a lot to do
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with the loss of faith in America subsequent to the Vietnam War. The Vietnam trauma
gave rise to a radical rejection of mainstream values and speeded the rise of a counter-
culture which fed on the riches of a hitherto repressed black culture. Then radical femi-
nism defined power as masculine and white, and the Watergate scandal reduced executi-
ve authority. "AmeriKKKa", it seemed, was a construct of pure repression, the American
creed was a sham, the American dream a nightmare. Add to this a growing criticism of
the urban capitalist moloch that - with the help of the military-industrial complex - was
set upon the destruction of our natural world. At the same time a post-fordist mode of
production led to massive deindustrialization which broke the older·class solidarity of
workers across racial and ethnic lines, created a split labor market and, as Richard Rorty
and others have claimed, led to a deepening "secession" between the successful and the
down and out during the Reagan era.27 In this situation of American self-doubt and de-
clining class options the older ethnic memories acquired the glow of a pastoral alternative.
Not only ethnic gemeinschaft against a bumt-out anonymous gesellschaft, but feminine,
ethnic culture against phallocratic, logocentric, patriarchal power, small-is-beautiful
against centralist homogeneity.28 The sixties saw a general flowering of non-hegemonic
sub-communities, into which the "new" ethnicity with its liberationist Herderian ethos
fitted·like hand in glove.
THE VALORIZATION OF DIFFERENCE
Radical.anthropologists had been first in fighting the tacit racist and hierarchical assump-
tions of evolutionary paradigms ("blacks are not ready yet") by insisting on a decentered,
non-hierarchical or decolonialized view of cultures. A new set of scholars in the tradition
of Melville Herskovits Cfhe Myth of the Negro Past 1941) pointed out that black culture
was not pathological or inferior, but both "beautiful on its own terms" and "historically
different." To undo the "marks of oppression" the battle cry "black is beautiful" of black
cultural nationalists called for a reversal of attitudes, and indeed certain black ways of
dressing, talking and dancing set a new agenda in the, appropriately named, countercul-
ture of white students. This new appreciation of post-colonial cultural forms set the stage
for a critique of enlightenment philosophy and ushered in a wave of European discontent
with Western civilization. Though this critique had old roots (Las Casas, Montaigne) its
last wave was first inspired by Horkheimer & Adorno's Dialectic of Englightenment
(1945) and Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man, but owed more to the work of
French deconstructionists. These took their inspiration from Nietzsche and Heidegger,
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both critics of the enlightenment project, and the latter a bete noire of theFrankfurt
school. What the fighters for Civil Rights had identified as the sinsAGAINST 18th cen-
tury enlightenment turned out to be, enlarged by the lenses of French theory, the sin OF
enlightenment. The sin, its. original core, amounted to the exclusion of the colonial Other
from "universalistic" world views.
ETHNICITY AND THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE
Most Americans would probably embrace multiculturalism if they could be sure that its
implementation would distribute life chances m0re evenly and make the country more
tolerant.29 This explains why the introduction of affirmative action programs was initially
uncontroversial. Most Americans accepted Lyndon B. Johnson's metaphor that a runner
who had been chained for three centuries could not compete in the rat race without a
"head start." Hence affirmative steps ·were taken to compensate for the many visible and
invisible obstacles which despite the fall of all legal barriers and the introduction of equal
opportunity kept blacks out of certain schools and jobs. As Gertrude Ezorsky writes, "we
need formal discrimination in favor of blacks to offset the effects of persistent informal di-
scrimination against them."30
The combination of factors, first the new appreciation for the legitimacy of black culture'
and then the policy of affirmative action did much good; today there is·a solid black
upper middle and middle class which penetrated into many professions that were classi-
cally white domains. Many blacks from all social strata have embraced their own tradi-
tions with new appreciation as is evidenced in the flowering of film and music. Yet, there
were unintended consequences. In order to achieve the promise of the color-blind creed of
one universal culture which would treat all Americans regardless of race, religion and
nationalorigin, the new soda! policy had to define on the basis of anthropological criteria
of cultural difference who was entitled to "affinnative action", to set-asides and to prefe-
rential treatment. The question "who is a minority" became a thoroughly confusing and
confused legal issue.31 Though affirmative action was intended as a short-range remedy
to undo long-range social and economic difference, it hardened the ideological and politi-
cal structures of difference. First it encouraged what Freud has called "the narcissism· of
small difference" and refined the cult of ethnic sensitivity.32 The seconddilemma was
that this desire to implement Civil Rights justice and social equality required a code of le-
gislative criteria of ethnic or racial difference to establish who was ''black'', thus revitali-
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zing the anthropological code of "difference" that had buttressed the old racist system of
the South along the color line.33 The North American color line, as Papa Doc Duvalier
noted, marks a somatic "difference" imposed by the racial paranoia of white Anglo-Saxon
men. The shrewd former roler of Haiti once was asked by an American journalist how
many people of white blood there were left in Haiti. Papa Doc replied: "About 95%."
When the journalist expressed disbelief in view of the nearly all-black population of Haiti,
Papa Doc asked how the Americans defined who was black. The journalist replied "anyo-
ne with a drop of black blood" and Papa Doc responded: "anyone with a drop of white
blood, that's exactly how we define whites."34 Papa Doc makes visible that the color line
is a line of pathological white fear, and that therefore any "affirmative action" based on its
somatic norms stabilizes that older somatic divide first institutionalized by "dead white
radsts. "35
The new valorization of ethnic difference and its attendant wave of ethnic pride clearly
did serve to build a better sense of self. But defensive identity politics also encourages the
growth of a new ethnocentrism which in turn leads to a strengthening of ethnic bounda-
ries as a defense not only against the dominant culture, but also against other groups. The
current black antisemitism is only one indication that identity politics sets in motion an
ugly dialectic of "my otherness is more legitimate than your othemess."36 The right to an
ethnocentric view is sometimes justified by the experience of actual sodal and political
discrimination. The argument runs that people who have suffered radsm cannot be racists
themselves, or, put in other words, black antisemitism is - in the larger context of Ameri-
can race relations - politically legitimate and ought to be accepted by the Jews.37 Proof of
suffering then legitimates ethnochauvinism. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the
anti-hegemonic discourse of many ethnic groups reads like an exercize in comparative
victimization.38 The grand recit of America has moved from the successes of the melting
pot to the victims of hegemony.
DIFFERENCE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
The legal scholar Martha Minow writes: "How can historical discrimination on the basis of
race and gender be overcome if the remedies themselves use the forbidden categories of
race and gender? Yet without such remedies, how can historical discrimination and its
legacies of segregation and exclusion be transcended?"39 This is indeed the dilemma of
valorizing ethnic difference and of institutionalizing such difference by politics and law. Is
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affirmative boundary maintenance any better than negative boundary maintenance?
Martha Minow writes: "Solutions to the dilemma of difference cannot work if they rede-
posit the responsibility for redressing negative meanings of difference on the person who
is treated as different." That may weIl be, but the problem gets infinitely more complica-
ted when negative differences are recoded as positive differences and claimed as an ethnic
strength. Then negative ascriptions turn into positive identity politics thus stabilizing the
difference, but usually without shedding their negative soda! consequences within the
larger political culture.40 Is the ethnochauvinism of victims better than the ethnochau-
vinism of oppressors? Prima facie, yes; in terms of short range goals for the group, yes;
but it does not solve the problem of inter-ethnic coexistence in a political culture.
As the attitude towards ethnic difference became more positive during the seventies and
eighties, the older grounds for a "negative discrimination" became new grounds for "posi-
tive discrimination" by administrative 6at.41 Consequently ethnic difference, thus ennob-
led, moved from the realm of private culture or folklore to that of public politics. When
other ethnic groups saw that "ethnicity" could be changed from a cultural liability to a
political advantage, they cried "me too." Native Americans and Chicanos could also make
strong claims on the basis of previous exclusion, hence Red and Brown Power movements
followed in the wake of the Black Power movement on the basis of very similar political
agendas. A particularly bitter reaction came from a white ethnie working class that had -
between 1830 and 1960 - been socialialized into the American racialist system, and who
were puzzled that their understanding of how the American system worked (including its
racial advantages) no longer held. The extreme swing of classical Democratic voters to the
conservative independents (George Wallace) and to Nixon, or the current success of Da-
vid Duke in Louisiana has a lot to do with this feeling of being ignored. Why were white
ethnic workers not recognized as victims of the system? The ensuing revival of white
ethnicity (Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans etc.) was interpreted by liberal critics a
kneejerk reaction of these white groups to Civil Rights and to the new ethnie politics
favoring blacks and Native Americans. Hut it can also be seen as a a successful attempt to
depolarize the black-white conflict by multilateralizing ethnicity.42 By taking the entitle-
ments of white ethnic groups seriously,govemment could deflect their anger over prefe-
rential treatment of blacks (and soon of Indians and Hispanies). All this led to a surpri-
sing revitalization, if not reconstruction of white ethnic consciousness andethnic affirma-
tion.
14
Was it areturn of the repressed or primordial ethnicity7 Were the American ethnics really
"unmeltable" as the conservative scholar Michael Novak claimed? Were the Italian-Ameri-
cans really Italians? Were African Americans really Africans? Were the deculturated "lost"
groups such as triracial isolates really lost tribes of Israel or Carthage?43 Glazer and Moy-
nihan's claim that "the melting pot did not happen" was often misunderstood to mean
that the traditional or original cultures had survived immigration. What they meant ho-
wever, was that the American ethnic group was not a "survival from the age of mass
immigration, but a new social form." Milton Gordon argued along similar lines, namely
that cultural pluralism would be replaced by a structural assimilation: although people
from ethnic groups interacted with their own members more frequently than with others,
ethnic languages and cultural markers were fast disappearing giving way to new, Le.
American cultural forms organized along the lines of American voluntary associations.44
What we have then is not the old "primordial", but a new "ethnic" quality. (fhe charge by
ethnic groups that the dominant American culture is "Eurocentrlc" strikes European obser-
vers as somewhat short of the mark.) As Fredrick Barth argued in Ethnic GrouEs and
Boundaries (1969), we should foeus on "the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not
the eultural stuff that it encloses." Or in other words, the cultural stuff need not be "genui-
ne" or "primordial" in order to shape an American ethnic group. For this is their point, in
a polity which gives high priority to voluntarism it is as American as cherry pie for peo-
pIe to congregate in ethnic groups. "Ethnicity" then is an American quality which emerges
when several groups of different nationalorigin are united in one political system, when
many ethnic cultures find their slot in one economic structure.45
The voluntaristic quality of white ethnicity is nowhere more evident than in the changed
instructions for census takers. The 1980 census ancestry questionnaire instructs the census
takers: "Prlnt the ancestry group with which the person identifies."46 Ethnic self-identifi-
cation - as the Census Bureau officers wamed - allows for a greater degree of flux and
choice. Ethnicity is no longer decided on the basis of "hard" historical data of genealogical
descent, but of cultural consent which invites a good deal of phantasy.47 A Greek could
conceivably be born again ethnically as an Italian or vice versa, though a black would
have a hard time to pass before the eyes of the census taker.48 However, even people of
hopelessley mixed background may thus cleanse themselves of bastardization and rein-
vent themselves as pure ethnics choosing that ethnic group they would like to be identi-
fied with.49 In the event of too much confusion of ethnic backgrounds the first group
15
mentioned by the head of the household will be laken for identification. (TheLouisiana
census for the first time lists about 150 people who self-identify as Aleuts.) What these
flight patterns from the melting pot, now encouraged by the census, express may simply
be areaction to that suburban, meltingpot anonymity, so compellingly described in Da-
vid Riesman's The Lonely Crowd. But it also signals a deep phobia against mixing, most
radically evidenced in the persistence and renewed maintenance· of the racial divide. Per-
haps it marks also a powerful reaction to the real historical cultural mixing that has gone
on in American society. In one branch of Western philosophy there is a tacit background
assumption, which ranks "purity" higher than "mixture"i·hence the notion of biological
blending (miscegenation!) or cultural mixture (bastardization), which has traditionally
inspired the nationalist right wing with outrage,SO now begins to have a bad press even
among the descendants of such processes in America. The Harvard Encyclopedia of Ame-
rican Ethnic Groups, whose credentials as adefender of liberalism are beyond doubt,
nonetheless treats 106 ethnic groups as if they were discrete and separate groups loyal to
the notion of biological and cultural purity. Any mixture between the' groups, which,
unmeltable ethnics notwithstanding, has been rampant in American history, does not re-
ceive much attention from the authors of national entries. But mixture is the stuff of Ame-
rican culture. And some of the most significant "American" contributions to world culture
have been such mixtures: jazz, pop & youth culture, dance, architecture, everyday con-
sumer culture.51 Ironically much of the public acknowledgementof ethnic cultures today
serves as a symbolic reparation for the alleged damage done to them by the melting pot.
Many American ethnie ideologues work on the assumption that their true heritage was
destroyed by the hegemonic melting pot and that their renewed ethnicity should restore
the real older article. They fail to realize how much ethnic groups have changed what
they fight as "the mainstream", how America they have become in the exercize of their
rights, and that even their voluntary new ethnicity is an American cultural creation.
This ethnic purity potlatch is particularly evident in the current demand for clean speech.
Language is the result of historical practice, hence it shows all the impurities of such
practice. The demand to cleanse the rhetoric of politics of outrageous discrimination is
understandable and reasonable, but the attempt to purge it of all hegemonic residues has
a paranoid dimension. Leftist historians and social scientists in particular have a hard
time using their professionallexicon at conferences or in class without being challenged
by word-watchers. At bottom there is the utopia of eliminating all radst and hegemonic
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evil from social intercourse and be left with completely egalitarian, positive thinking. In a
pluralist setting this would leave us with a congerie of no fault cultures that would ban
Satan effectively from the premises. It is time therefore to think again of the possibility
and reality of ethnic and particularly interethnic evil.
Most Americans would probably opt for some sort of soft messy pluralism under the
auspices of a reformed 18th century universalism watched over by the Supreme Court, Le.
for some version of what they had before. But the actual politieal and social implemen-
tation of ethnie polities whieh has emerged in recent years has given rise to some alarm.
There seems to be an interna! dynamie in ethnie discourse and politics to aim for "pure"
or "radieal" ethnicity whieh in turn would require a eorporate or eonsoeiationalist multi-
culturalism.52 In keeping with this dynamic some of the more strident ethnie lobbyists
insists on the essentialist, intrinsic or nationalist definition of ethnic difference by stipula-
ting the politieal priority of primary bonds (blood ties, name, pigmentation) or of colleeti-
ve historical experienee (slavery, genocide) while at the same time dismissing any univer-
salism as part of the WASP power structure (whatever that may be these days) and as a
scherne to introduce Anglo-conformity and white Euro-American ethnocentrism. In their
view the Euro-American political "creed" of the founding fathers was not only falsely and
hypocritically labeled "universal," but is to this day irredeemably racist. Few people (ex-
cepting unreeonstructed conservatives such as Allan Bloom, William J. Bennett and aged
heads of English departments) would want to resurreet the hypocritical and narrow uni-
versaIism of slave holding founding fathers. ClearIy, the uneritical aeceptance of the oider
Eurocentrie American creed as outlined by Gunnar Myrdal and resurrected by neoeonser-
vative critics is not a realistic option in a multiethnie America.53 Nor is the critique of
enlightenment universalism advanced by Heidegger and filtered through French sources
into the Ameriean academie discourse without merit. If, as Stanley Fish and others have
argued, a new rneta-universalism of constant hermeneutic and critieal debate eould be
guaranteed that would establish interethnic eulture as an unending conversation (Kenneth
Burke) then all the better. However, this would require an enormous capacity for self-cri-
ticism and sophistication which I do not see emerging from within ethnic group or in
interethnie diseourse. Yet, as Isaiah Berlin, a staunch defender of a non-hegemonie plura-
lism in the tradition of Herder and Vico, admits, hopes for such a meta-universalism are
dirn: "I admit that at the end of the twentieth century, there is little historical evidenee for
the realizability of such avision..." and he ends on a ehilling (and somewhat unfair) note:
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"I am glad to be as old as I am."54 Although one is tempted at this point to trat out the
idea of an American exceptionalism again, the question remains, will it work in the politi-
cal arena given its current structure, will it work in the judicial arena, will it save con-
stitutional "progress" sincethetimes of }efferson? Not without a major effort in general
education for which there is at the moment no recognizable political will and little con-
crete evidence.55
TI-IE DILEMMA OF PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS
The current decline of a belief in one political culture is evidenced in the inability of the
Democratic Party to design anational agenda or of Jessie Jackson to get the various ethnic
leaders to surrender some of their local ethnie power to the demands of anational rain-
bow coalition. This situation has made it easier and more expedient for ethnic groups to
instrumentalize ethnicity locally which separates rather than unites the body politic. The
short-range advantage for each local group may turn into a long-range disadvantage for
the "United" states. Could it be that the American method of problemsolving along the
lines of middle range pragmatic goals such as "affirmative action" or "bilingualism" or
"quotas" transports in its wake long range consequences towards a consociational real-
ignment of political culture that critical members of the American left are only beginning
to understand? In a discussion with a college president known for her liberal views I tried
-to get her to talk about the principles of inclusion and exclusion; she waved my question
aside and insisted on setting short range goals such as increasing the number of ethnic
'faculty or students "by next year."56
DISPLACEMENT OF CLASS DISCOURSE
Of the foursome "gender-race-ethnicity-class" (GREC), that graces many titles of articles
and workshops in American Studies, the term "class" has become devoid of its older signi-
ficance and punch. It is particularly alarming that the problem of class divisions within
and beyond ethnic groups no longer plays a decisive role and has disappeared from most
discourse of ethnicity. Pierre van den Berghe writes: "If the main line of cleavage in a
society is ethnicity (or some, feature of it, such as religion or language), if the political
game is seen primarily as an ethnic balancing act in the allocation of scarce resources, and
if there are no glaring disparities in ethnie representation at various class levels, it follows
that the significance of class cleavages with each ethny is correspondingly decreased."57
However, while the discourse of class has grown feeble there is a growing recognition
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that America despite the absence of a European class "consciousness" is moving towards a
dichotomized stratification which is geared to education and which cuts through the new
ethnic fragmentation.58
The rise of ethnicity has been a boon for the new ethnic elites; we witness a consociational
coexistence of these elites as ethnic spokesmen and -women in the public sphere. It is the
strengthening of these new elites and of elite discourses that will in the long run encoura-
ge the development of a consociational or corporate multiculturalism. And the division
between the class interests of these elites and of the people they speak for is widening. Do
we not have here a resurgence of an old problem along the racial fault line, that W.E.B.
DuBois diagnosed in 1903 as being America's most persistent problem. We witness the
return of a division between what James Madison in Federalist 10 called the realm of pas-
sion and the realm of principle, this time compounded by race, class, .poverty and a decre-
pit primary and secondary educational system in the cities. The realm of high principles
on which America was founded is abstract, universal, high cultural and was - until 1954 -
under white, male, middle class control. The deconstruction of dead white male power
may have expanded these principles to include "all people", but the enjoyment and the
entertainment of these principles is still tied to class, Le. to the academically trained upper
middle class. Political universalism, so claim its black detractors, was mainly observed in
the breach and has had a hypocritical history until the Civil Rights legislation of the six-
ties made blacks full citizens. The realm of popular passions, of warm ethnic feelings may
be of a lower order in the evolution of the philosophy of government, but it is simpler,
more affective, more low-down, and often it constitutes the only bond blacks in the inner
city have left short of what Cornel West identifies as an explosive black nihilism.59 Is not
here a class/cultural difference in the political cultures, between the unenlightened desires
and circumscribed aspirations of black populist groups vs. the high universal feelings and
experiences of the middle and upper classes most of whom are white, or in the case of the
black middle class are perceived by inner city blacks as being close to white.60 This wi-
dening dichotomy between the well-educated upper middle class that can afford to have
principles and an undereducated underclass that is not able to cope with material survival
translates the soft multiculturalism of enlightened pedagogical theory into a hard political
multiculturalism of the streets. Could it be that the new elite discourse of "gender-race-
ethnicity" serves to repress a consideration of the more difficult issues of class and pover-
ty which to many Americans, even to some liberals, seem so intractable (and boring).
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Could it be that multiculturalism avoids a serious consideration of poverty by favoring a
reactive notion of race or ethnic "gemeinschaft"; in short, that it is an instance of an over-
determination of culture and arepression of class divisions at the very moment when
these begin to hurt. It is indicative for the current ethnic fragmentation of a liberal agenda
in the US that it takes a conservative, Kevin Phillips, to point out the new class divisions
in his The Politics of Rich and Poor. Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan
Aftermath 1990.
Areal cultural division has emerged between a liberal expectancy of white tull citizens
that all men are created equal, that a universally legitimated cultural pluralism is possible,
that the recognition and tolerance of difference is an educationally feasible goal, that whi-
le privately blacks may be different in their cultural preferences, publicly they are the
same before the law - all this is part of the clC:lssical or reformed liberal American creed -
and the experience of a certain black and Hispanic class of daily structural and personal
difference in chances or in treatment, a difference between abstract principles of a liberal
and comfortable existence and the concrete life experience of the socalied non-coping
classes. It articulates the differences within black and Hispanic society, but most forcefully
the chasm between a white and black or Hispanie life world. Many blacks maintain that
there has been a widening gap between liberal wishful thinking and sociocultural practice.
Over the years.they discem a subtle and steady reinforcement of boundaries in the rela-
tions between black and white Americans which resulted in the steady growth of differen-
ces in culture and society, first by apartheid in slavery, then by racism in the laws and
customs, finally by a deep and subtle negative ascription through stereotypes in the domi-
nant popular culture which are met by counter-stereotypes. Typecasting began in the Min-
strel show, continued in film and on in current TV, codified by the tyranny of expectation
on the part of Hollywood trained viewing publics. The difference was stabilized through
continued territo.rialization and ghettoization in the northem cities.61 And the difference
was further buttressed through the economicmarginalization of ghetto dwellers in the
inner city after deindustrialization took away the income of the black working class.62
Most recently, educated blacks have made a cultural advantage of a social disadvantage
and through a black assertion of ethnicity, of black inner city culture, and of black cultural
nationalism, and have begun to recode the negative cultural ascription into a positive one,
but, and this again is crucial and articulates the new class division, using the older black
lower class culture, not the largely invisible new black middle class culture as a common
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cultural ground. The revalorization of a black street culture or subculture as a counter-
weight to white bourgeois culture has had a problematical consequence, namely the nega-
tion of an ideological role or a political space for the black middle class. In fact, the con-
cept of "middle class" as it is defined in Robert Bellah's Habits of the Heart itself is consi-
dered "white" by many radicals.63 Black middle class kids report that they have to hide
what they learned at College before their inner city friends if they do not want to be ta-
ken as "oreo cookies", Le. as black outside, white inside. Certainly the middle class Ameri-
can lifestyle owes more to white than to black influence, but this fact is part of a repres-
sion of the black middle class. There is hope. The black film makers or Rap musicians
whose work focuses on lower class black street culture are members of that (largely invi-
sible) black middle class.64 Indeed, currently we witness an attempt of black middle class
artists and intellectuals to define themselves as a "new class."65 It is to be hoped that the
emerging black and Hispanic middle class will be visible evidence that a new, critical uni-
versalism across ethnic divides is an attractive possibility for blacks and Hispanics in
America. Once this belief finds enough tangible evidence in sodal reform the ]effries, Far-
rakhans and Asantes won't have much of a chance, and the rhetoric of radical multicultu-
ralism will blow by as one of those creedal passions of which the mediatized American
public sphere is so inordinately fond.
THE EDUCAnON OF AMERICAN ETHNICS
While the nation was trying to overcome the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate the stu-
dent bodies and faculties of American universities did in fact become more "multicultu-
ral." As the universities expanded numerically and ethnically, they went into a recession,
and the battle over scarce resources and shrinking opportunities became more intense. It
is no accident that the debate over multiculturalism should have arisen at the universities.
For it is a battle over access to those educational resources that are required for the only
well-paying career tracks left in a post-fordist economy. In the split labour market of the
post-fordist American economy, a university degree marks the difference between badly
paid unskilled and highly paid skilied jobs, between lucrative work and minimum wage
McWork. Lawrence Mishel and David M. Frankel write: "Simply put, it has become in-
creasingly hard for a worker without a college degree to eam a middle-class standard of
living. This is very troubling because three-fourth of today's work force (even those 25-34
years old) have not completed college..."66 In sum, as long as there is no political will for
social reform that would benefit not only the "coping strata" of ethnic groups (as did
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affirmative action), but the poar across the ethnic spectmm, little will change, and multi-
culturalism will remain a highly ideological issue with contradictory agendas. One thing
is clear: there is a complex of motives at work in the current confusing and confused
debate, and despite all the culturological rhetoric most of these motives have asound
economic base.67
AN EXCEPTIONALIST POSTCRIPT
Many neoconservative prophets of doom in this debate forget that the crisis (and confu-
sion) of national identity and sodal purpose is of course as old as the republic and that
the American creed thrives on "the promise of disharmony.n68 American identity may
have started out as White. Anglo-Saxon and Protestant;. but soon immigrant Catholics
challenged the Protestant definition, then non-Anglo-Saxon groups from Europe questio-
ned the Anglo-~axon imperative. From the Civil War to the Civil Rights legislation there
were aseries ofchallenges to the adjective "white". Concurrently women questioned the
malepowerstru~ure.The new debate over the politics of ethnidty belongs to this series
of productive challenges of a racialist practice which gave the lie to the original univer-
salist creed, challenges which have resulted in a marked change of the American host
society and to constant revisions of that creed in practice. Yet, none of these previous
challenges has ever questioned the need of a universalist credo as a basis. Alexis de Toc-
queville said two things were remarkable about America, the great changeableness of
human behavior and the singular fixity of fundamental principles: "men living in demo-
cratic societies... are forever varying, altering and restoring secondary matters, but they
are very careful·not to touch fundamentals. They love changes, but they dread revolu-
tions."69 What most neoconservatives, some old and some new radicals worry about, is
that the new multiculturalism, proposed bythe more radical spokesmen, may not remain
a "secondary matter," but that itmay erode the necessary universalism of a multiethnic
American political culture. More sinister yet are the long range institutional, bureaucrati~
and therefore political consequences of a however well-meantpolitics ·of difference. It is to
be hoped that the politics of ethnicity and race will not result in a congerie of competing
pockets of ethnocentrism which imitate the worst excesses of a self-congratulatory and
parochial American exceptionalism, and that ethnicity will continue to be defined under
the incorporative motto: e pluribus unum, with the understanding that the ethnic "pluri-
bus" playsecond fiddle to the constitutional "unum."70
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